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Individual Disparate Impact Law:
On The Plain Meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
By Michael J. Zimmer*
The plain meaning of section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii), added to Title VII'
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act"), 2 creates an entirely new
individual disparate impact action. An individual protected by Title VII
can establish a disparate impact claim under section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii)
simply by proving: (1) that the employer took adverse action against
the plaintiff based on an "employment practice;" (2) that an alternative
practice exists that serves the employer's interests yet would not
adversely affect the plaintiff; and (3) that the employer refuses to adopt
the better alternative.3 Contrary to preexisting Title VII actions, this
new cause of action does not include an intent to discriminate4 or
pretext element,5 and does not require any showing of group impact.6
In short, I call this new action the "individual disparate impact" cause
of action.
In enacting the new section 703(k), Congress intended to fix the
damage to disparate impact law caused by the Supreme Court in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.7 This section, however, did not
overturn Wards Cove.8 Instead, Congress created an entirely new
method of establishing disparate impact discrimination. While the
parts are familiar, the structure is new. As the end product of a long
and partisan political battle,9 this new structure is a compromise. This
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I want to thank Eddie
Hartnett, Margaret Moses, and Charlie Sullivan.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A, 29 U.S.C.A., and 42
U.S.C.A.).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part IL.B.2.a.
5. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
6. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
7. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that disparate
impact is not alone established by a showing of racial imbalance, but that a specific
employment practice must create the disparate impact and must be capable of statistical
demonstration).
8. See id.
9. See Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," A
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compromise, however, raises as many questions as it answers.' 0
Specifically, the new section 703(k)'s complex and intricate nature
makes it less amenable to "open textured" judicial interpretation than
the original Title VII." Accordingly, it is important to carefully
examine the terms of section 703(k). 2 The United States Supreme
Codification of Griggs, A Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 287, 371-73 (1993) (discussing the torturous political process leading
to the enactment of the 1991 Act between President Bush and the Republicans in
Congress on one side and the Democratic majority in Congress on the other side).
10. This reminds me of my days as a law student when Article 2 of the original U.C.C.
was replacing the preexisting law of sales. The course I took and the casebooks I read
discussed the impact of the U.C.C. upon the preexisting sales law. In fact, so much
changed with this new codified approach that the more useful approach would have been
to study the U.C.C. and use the preexisting law of sales to better understand the U.C.C.
For an example of such a first generation approach to interpreting the 1991 Act, see
Browne, supra note 9.
11. The original statutory source of all three major substantive theories-individual
disparate treatment, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), systemic
disparate treatment, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), and systemic disparate impact, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971)-is the word "discriminate" in section 703(a). Section 703(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) (to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k).
12. Section 703(k) in its entirety provides:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if -
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph
(C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent
refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice
causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining
party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice
causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can
demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's decision making
process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decision making
process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
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Court undertakes careful analysis to interpret statutes. Specifically, the
Rehnquist majority13 is known for its use of a "plain meaning"
approach because they interpret statutes based on the plain meaning of
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does
not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to
demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.
(C)(I) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in
accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the
concept of "alternative employment practice."
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business
necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional
discrimination under this subchapter.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a rule barring the
employment of an individual who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a
controlled substance, as defined in schedules I and II of section 102(6) of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802(6)), other than the use or
possession of a drug taken under the supervision of a licensed health care
professional, or any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled
Substances Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et. seq.] or any other provision of Federal
law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter only if such rule is adopted or applied with an intent to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k).
13. The "Rehnquist majority" at the present time consists of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice Anthony
Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas. See Donald 0. Johnson, The Civil Rights Act of
1991 and Disparate Impact: The Response to Factionalism, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV 469,
470 n.8 (1992) (describing the majority at the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
with Justice Thomas now replacing Justice White).
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their terms. 14 Specifically, those who follow the plain meaning rule
"follow the plain meaning of the statutory text, except when text
suggests an absurd result or a scrivener's error."' 5 While doubts exist
that the Rehnquist majority is always true to this approach, 16 plain
meaning arguments can be forceful because they focus on the language
in the statute.
17
The plain meaning of section 703(k) is the theme throughout this
essay. First, this essay demonstrates that section 703(k)(1)(A) creates
separate causes of action in its subsections (i) and (ii).18 Subsection (i)
is the source of "group disparate impact" and subsection (ii) of
"individual disparate impact" discrimination. Next, this essay
examines the structure of this new subsection (ii) individual disparate
impact action. 19 Part A explains that the burden of proof in a
subsection (ii) action is always on the plaintiff.2' Part B discusses the
meaning of the phrase "alternative employment practice" for purposes
of the subsection (ii) cause of action.2' Part C shows that the second
part of subsection (ii) requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer
14. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION app. 3 at 323
(1994) (footnotes omitted); see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 485 (tracing the new
plain meaning approach of the Rehnquist majority in the context of disparate impact
law). But cf., Patrick M. McFadden, Fundamental Principles of American Law, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1749, 1754 (1997) ("The surest way to misread a law is to read it literally.").
Johnson focuses on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Watson v. Fortworth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), as an example of the Rehnquist majority approach. It noted
that:
The plurality [in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust] whole-heartedly
embraced textualism or legal formalism as the correct method of interpreting
Title VII. Textualism's central premise dictates that the court should apply the
plain meaning of a statute. One finds this plain meaning by presuming that
the legislature employed the statute's words in their ordinary sense, thus
enabling the jurist to understand the statute through careful reading. This frees
the textualist from the burden of inquiring into legislative purpose and intent,
as understood by the legal process theorists, or studying legislative history.
Those tools are dismissed as susceptible to manipulation and as judicial means
of undermining the reasoned decision of the legislature. (citation omitted.)
Id.
15. ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, app. 3 at 323.
16. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, at 273 ("The Court's civil rights decisions from
1989 to 1991 do not represent its adherence to plain meaning.").
17. There is, however, a certain bizarre aspect of having a statute that is ambiguous
and unclear because the legislature could not agree to a statute that was clear, and then
have a court insist that it would only give the terms that were used their plain meaning.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
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refuses to adopt an alternative employment practice even though the
employer knows of its existence.22 Finally, this essay presents a case
interpreting subsection (ii) and compares the new individual disparate
impact cause of action under section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii), with the
individual disparate treatment theory.23
I. SUBSECTIONS (i) AND (ii) OF SECTION 703(K)(1)(A) ESTABLISH
SEPARATE CAUSES OF ACTION
Section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii) creates a new cause of action separate from
the group disparate impact action created in subsection (i). This
separate cause of action is based on the way subsection (ii) and
subsection (i) are joined.24 Disparate impact law decided under the
original Title VII, before the 1991 Act amendments, clouds the clarity
of this separation. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody is one decision that
creates such confusion.25 In Albemarle, the United States Supreme
Court created a three-step process to litigate disparate impact cases: (1)
in his or her prima facie case, the plaintiff was required to prove that
an employer's practice had a disparate impact on members of groups
protected by Title VII; (2) the defendant could rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case by proving the challenged employment practice was
job related and consistent with business necessity; (3) and further,
even if the defendant succeeded in its rebuttal, the plaintiff could
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See infra Part III.
24. Section 703(k)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) are separated by the word "or." This section
provides:
(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph
(C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent
refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
25. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (upholding disparate impact
liability and awarding back pay after a finding of unlawful discrimination despite the
employer's absence of bad faith). An early interpretation of Title VII created the concept
of disparate impact discrimination. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971) (holding the employer's requirements that employees have high school diplomas
and pass tests for promotions were not job related and were illegal due to their disparate
impact on minorities). The Griggs decision, however, did not articulate the litigation
structure for a disparate impact action. See id.
1999]
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prevail on surrebuttal by proving pretext, meaning the defendant could
have used other practices with less discriminatory impact that also
served its legitimate interest.26
Most attempts to construe the new section 703(k)(1)(A) deal with
the impact of its language on this preexisting Albemarle Paper three-
step process.27 Plain meaning demands that this construction begins
with the new statute's language rather than the prior Albemarle Paper
three-step process. 28  If that is done, it is clear that section
703(k)(1)(A) creates two new disparate impact causes of action out of
the three steps that were formally one cause of action under Albemarle
Paper. The first cause of action, a group disparate impact action,
arises under subsection (i) using the first two steps of the Albemarle
Paper process. Under this action, the plaintiff has the burden of
showing that an employer's practice had an adverse impact and that the
defendant failed to meet its burden to rebut this claim with proof that
the practice served a business necessity.29 Subsection (ii) creates a
second cause of action, the individual disparate impact action, based
on the third pretext step of the Albemarle Paper approach.3 °
Section 703(k)(1)(A) subsection (i) sets forth the first cause of
action, which includes two steps marked below by the imposed
brackets:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if - (i) [1] a
complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and [2]
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice
26. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1037-38 (1993) (discussing the case law that
Congress relied upon to create this new section of the 1991 Act relied upon); Browne,
supra note 9, at 371-73 (suggesting that the pretext rule of Albemarle remains
unchanged).
28. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17 (discussing the "plain meaning"
approach to statutory interpretation).
29. See supra note 24. It is beyond the scope of this article to address the many
issues raised concerning the cause of action created by subsection (i).
30. A plaintiff must prove the following elements for an individual disparate impact
cause of action under subsection (ii): (1) the employer took adverse action against the
plaintiff based on an employment practice, (2) an alternative employment practice
exists that would serve the employer's interests but would not affect a plaintiff
adversely, and (3) the employer refuses to adopt that alternative. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (West 1994).
478 [Vol. 30
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is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity ....
The word "demonstrates," used twice in section 703(k)(1)(A)(i), is
defined in new section 701(m) as "meets the burdens of production
and persuasion. 32 Taken together, these two steps clearly state that
subsection (i) creates a cause of action for group disparate action much
like the first two steps of the Albemarle Paper process-the plaintiff
wins if he proves that the employer's practice had a disparate impact
and the employer fails to justify the practice. Subsection (i), however,
does not include the third pretext element of the Albemarle Paper
process.33
Joined to the opening phrase of section 703(k)(1)(A),34 subsection
(ii) establishes individual disparate impact liability independent of the
subsection (i) group disparate impact action:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if - (i) ... ; or (ii) the
complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative
employment practice.
Because Congress joined the two subsections with the word "or," it
clearly intended to make subsections (i) and (ii) complete and
independent causes of action. The common meaning of "or" supports
this argument. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines
"or" as "a function word to indicate (1) an alternative between different
or unlike things, states, or actions ... ; (2) choice between alternative
things, states, or courses[.],, 36 Thus, "or" under its plain meaning in
section 703(k)(1)(A) means that subsection (ii) is an alternative to
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
32. See § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-(m).
33. Once the defendant carries its rebuttal burden proving the practice was job related
and consistent with business necessity, the plaintiff would lose unless she could show
the practice was pretext for discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see also supra note 24 (providing the language of section
703(k)(1)(A)(i) and (ii)).
34. The opening phrase of the statute section is: "An unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if . 42, U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
3 5. See id. (emphasis added).
36. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY: UNABRIDGED 1585 (1986)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. A canon of plain meaning statutory construction is: "Follow
dictionary definitions of terms unless Congress has provided a specific definition." See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, app. 3 at 323 (footnotes omitted).
1999l
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subsection (i) and is both distinct and separate from it. 37  Thus,
plaintiffs who allege disparate impact liability have the option to
proceed under subsection (i), or subsection (ii), or both.38
Maintaining the Albemarle Paper process,39 however, would require
reading subsections (i) and (ii) as if they were conjoined with "and" 40
instead of "or."41 That would violate the plain meaning of the new
statutory scheme. Subsection (i) simply states that disparate impact
liability is established if [1] the plaintiff proves that an employment
practice used by the defendant causes disparate impact "and" [2] the
employer fails to prove it is job related and consistent with business
necessity.42 To attach subsection (ii)'s requirements to subsection (i)
would require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant failed to adopt an
available alternative, even if the defendant failed to carry its burden of
proof under part [2] of subsection (i) - that the practice the plaintiff
37. See Alito, supra note 27, at 1037 ("By providing in [new section 703(k)] that a
disparate impact plaintiff may make a case either by demonstrating that a particular
practice causes a disparate impact, or by proving that an alternative procedure which
does not have as great a disparate impact exists, the statute seems to make the
alternative procedure approach an entirely separate mode of proof.").
38. The individual aspect of this new cause of action may well make the most likely
joinder of causes of action be a subsection (ii) action with an individual disparate
treatment cause of action rather than with a group disparate impact action under
subsection (i). See infra Part m.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
40. Webster's defines "and" as "along with, altogether with" and "added to or linked
to." See WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 80.
41. Another modification of the statute to maintain the three-step Albemarle Paper
structure would be to move little roman numeral (i) from its present position after the
dash in section 703(k)(1)(A) to immediately after the word "and." As amended, the
statute would then read as follows:
(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if a complaining party demonstrates
that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and
(i) the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in sub-
paragraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the
respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
With this amendment, plaintiff must always prove disparate impact based on
membership in a protected class and either (i) the defendant fails to prove job relatedness
and business necessity or (ii) plaintiff proves an available alternative that the employer
refuses to adopt.
Moving the placement of (i) is a substantial structural change. It is better and more
appropriate for Congress to make this change rather than relying on a court
interpretion.
42. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k)(1)(A) (1994).
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challenges was job related and consistent with business necessity.
Therefore, the plaintiff could only win a disparate impact case under
section 703(k)(1)(A) by proving both the first part of subsection (i) -
that the challenged employment practice of the defendant caused
disparate impact - and all of subsection (ii) - that an alternative existed
that the employer refused to use. Essentially, this approach would
make job relatedness and business necessity irrelevant in disparate
impact cases and would relieve the defendant of its burden of
persuasion because the justification of the challenged practice would
not impact liability. Instead, the plaintiff would establish liability only
after she satisfies her burden in the first part of subsection (i) and
subsection (ii).
Removing the defendant's burden from the second part of
subsection (i) radically reconstructs the statute beyond replacing the
word "or" with "and." This reconstruction does not maintain the
three-step Albemarle Paper litigation structure.43 Instead, it remakes
disparate impact law into a strange, new two-step process with the
plaintiff first proving the employer's practice adversely affected a
group protected by Title VII and second proving that an alternative
existed that the employer refused to use.
To illustrate this radical change, it is necessary to examine the
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio4 decision. While the decision
made several significant changes to disparate impact law, it is
notorious for its impact upon business necessity and job relatedness.
First, the Supreme Court diluted "business necessity" to "business
justification., 45 "[A]t the justification stage of such a disparate-impact
case, the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer ....
The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's
justification for his use of the challenged practice. 46 Second, the
Court reduced the employer's "business justification" burden from a
43. See supra text accompanying note 26.
44. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
45. Id. at 659. Concerning the employer's justification, the court states as follows:
A mere insubstantial justification in this regard will not suffice, because such a
low standard of review would permit discrimination to be practiced through the
use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment practices. At the same time,
though, there is no requirement that the challenged practice be "essential" or
"indispensable" to the employer's business for it to pass muster ....
Id.
46. Id.
1999]
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burden of persuasion to a burden of production.47 To now conclude
that the 1991 Act drops from disparate impact law any need for the
employer to justify its practices would be remarkable and clearly
against plain meaning.48
To avoid this outcome and to maintain the Albemarle Paper three-
step approach,4 9 including the defendant's rebuttal burden on job
relatedness and business necessity, it would be necessary to amend
subsection (ii) beyond changing "or" to "and." This change would
include the addition of language like the following as an introductory
clause within subsection (ii): "or (ii), if respondent demonstrates that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity, the complaining party makes the
demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an
alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt
such alternative employment practice."5  Thus, the use of "or"-
combined with the lack of the necessary qualifying phrase that links
47. Id. ("The employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business
justification for his employment practice. The burden of persuasion, however, remains
with the disparate-impact plaintiff.").
48. Another very radical reconstruction of the statute could follow from construing
the "or" as "and." That would be to construe section 703(k)(1)(A) as providing for
liability for disparate impact only if the plaintiff proved disparate impact, the defendant
failed to justify its practice, and the plaintiff proved there was an alternative that the
defendant refused to adopt. Under this construction, the defendant would always win if it
proved its practice was justified as job related and necessary for its business, even if the
plaintiff also proved that an alternative existed that the defendant refused to adopt. This
construction should be rejected by an interpreting court because it violates plain
meaning and also fails to maintain the three-step Albemarle Paper structure.
49. See supra text accompanying note 26.
50. If Congress decided to amend the law to maintain the Albemarle Paper structure,
the complete section 703(k)(1)(A) would tentatively read:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this subchapter only if - (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or (ii), if
respondent demonstrates that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity, the complaining
party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to
an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such
alternative employment practice.
Nevertheless, even if some evidence illustrated that Congress meant to maintain
Albemarle Paper and include the defendant's burden in the new section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii),
this radical reconstruction should be left to affirmative Congressional action. Cf. 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (West 1994) (which does not include the underlined
phrase).
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the job relatedness and business necessity requirement to both
subsections (i) and (ii)-makes the meaning of section 703(k)(1)(A)
plain: subsection (i) and (ii) set forth two separate paths for
establishing disparate impact liability. To judicially "amend" sub-
section (ii) with additional language absent from the enacted statute is
difficult to justify from any perspective and is directly against the plain
meaning approach.51
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SUBSECTION (ii) INDIVIDUAL
DISPARATE IMPACT ACTION
Section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii)'s language requires close analysis of the
terms "demonstration," "alternative employment practice" and "refuses
to adopt."
A. The Burden of Persuasion in Subsection (ii) Actions
To see the overall structure of a subsection (ii) individual disparate
impact action, it is best to first address the burden of persuasion issue.
Unlike the use of the word "demonstrate" in the subsection (i) group
disparate impact action, subsection (ii) uses the word "demonstration"
to describe the plaintiff s obligation in an individual disparate impact
action." "Demonstration" in subsection (ii) is the noun form of the
verb "demonstrates" as defined in section 701(m). Webster's defines
"demonstrate" as "to manifest clearly, certainly, or unmistakably:
show clearly the existence of... to make evident or reveal as true by
reasoning processes, concrete facts and evidence . . . ."" Further, it
defines "demonstration" as "the act, process, or means of
demonstrating . . . ." As demonstration is the act of demonstrating,
the plain meaning of "demonstration" in subsection (ii) is the same as
the term "demonstrate" in subsection (i). 55 Thus, through plain
language reasoning, the plaintiff bears the burdens of both production
5 1. The need to add a clause to subsection (ii) along the lines suggested to maintain
the Albemarle Paper structure undermines any argument that the use of "or" was a slip of
the pen. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, app. 3 at 323 (footnotes omitted)
(citing to "scrivener's error" exception to plain meaning rule).
52. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-(m) (defining the term "demonstrates" as "meets the
burdens of production and persuasion."). Note that "demonstrate" as used in the
subsection (i) group disparate impact action is defined in section 701(m). Section
701(m) was also added to Title VII by the 1991 Act. See id.
53. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 600.
54. Id.
55. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, app. 3 at 323 (footnotes omitted) ("Interpret the
same or similar terms in a statute the same way.").
1999] 483
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and persuasion to show the "alternative employment practice."
With respect to the employer's conduct, neither "demonstrate,"
"demonstration" nor any similar word is included in the second part of
subsection (ii).56 Without some indication that the respondent is
required to prove anything on this issue, it appears that the plaintiff's
burdens of production and persuasion continue throughout subsection
(ii). In other words, the plaintiff must prove both the first part of
subsection (ii), the existence of the alternative employment practice, as
well as the second part, that the employer refuses to adopt it.
B. The Meaning of "Alternative Employment Practice"
The meaning of "alternative employment practice" is at the heart of
the subsection (ii) cause of action. Its meaning, however, is not easily
discerned. Developing the plain meaning of "alternative employment
practice" is a particularly difficult, multi-step process. Subsection (ii)
does not itself define "alternative employment practice." Instead it
refers to subsection (C) for a description. Subsection (C), however,
also neither defines nor describes "alternative employment practice."
Instead, to provide meaning to the term subsection (C) refers to the
term's legal meaning under the law as it "existed on June 4, 1989."" 7
Thus, the reader must refer to the prior state of the law.
1. The Significance of the June 4, 1989 Cutoff
June 4, 1989 is significant because the following day the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.
58
Clearly, subsection (C) precludes any use of Wards Cove to define
"alternative employment practice" in a subsection (ii) individual
disparate impact action.59 Ironically, the precise phrase "alternative
employment practice" does not appear in the majority opinion in Wards
Cove. Rather, Justice White's opinion in Wards Cove uses various
phrases that relate to the concept of "alternative employment practice."
These include "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, [that] would also serve the employer's
56. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii). Rather, subsection (ii) only provides
that "the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice." Id.
57. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) ("The demonstration referred to by subparagraph
(A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to
the concept of 'alternative employment practice."').
58. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. at 642.
59. See id. at 661.
[Vol. 30
1999] Individual Disparate Impact Law 485
legitimate [hiring] interest[s],",60 "availability of alternative practices to
achieve the same business ends with less racial impact," 61 "alternative
practices, '6 and "proposed alternative selection devices. Each is
related to the concept of "alternative employment practice" because
each suggests alternative practices for the employer other than those
the plaintiff challenges. Nevertheless, the cutoff date established in
subsection (C) precludes reliance upon Wards Cove for the definition
of an "alternative employment practice" in a subsection (ii) action.
Puzzling as it seems, the phrase "alternative employment practice" is
absent from every Supreme Court disparate impact decision preceding
Wards Cove.6 4 The most similar language can be found in Justice
O'Connor's 1988 plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust.65 In her opinion she used language that the majority of the
Court would adopt the next year in Wards Cove.6 6
[W]hen a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate
impact, and when the defendant has met its burden of producing
evidence that its employment practices are based on legitimate
business reasons, the plaintiff must "show that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect,
would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in efficient
and trustworthy workmanship." Factors such as the cost or
other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are
60. Id. at 660 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
61. Id. at 658.
62. Id. at 661.
63. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988)).
64. The decisions of lower federal courts also offer little assistance in defining the
"law" of "alternative employment practices" in cases decided before the cutoff date in
subsection (C). In a search of federal employment discrimination cases decided before
June 4, 1989, only three opinions by one district court judge used the term "alternative
employment practice." The concept, however, was not at issue. Judge Nixon of the
Middle District of Tennessee rendered the following decisions regarding alternative
employment practices. See Mineo v. Transportation Mgmt. of Tenn., Inc., 694 F.
Supp. 417, 427 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (mentioning alternative employment practice but
finding that plaintiff bus driver failed to establish that employer's practice of
prohibiting former heart attack victims from driving public buses adversely impacted
plaintiffs protected age group); Kincade v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 694 F. Supp.
368, 376 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (holding that job applicants failed to demonstrate that
Firestone's hiring and assignment procedures adversely affected blacks); Mosley v.
Clarksville Mem'l Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 224, 232 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (deciding that
plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence that the hospital engaged in hiring and
promotion practices that had a discriminatory effect on blacks).
65. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (holding that disparate
impact analysis applied to employment decisions based on subjective criteria).
66. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61.
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relevant in determining whether they would be equally as
effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer's
legitimate business goals.
67
Although Watson satisfies the June 4, 1989 cutoff date, its discussion
of alternative selection devices is neither precedent nor binding because
Justice O'Connor's statement on this issue is a plurality opinion and
not an opinion of a majority.68 Thus, like Wards Cove, it appears that
Watson cannot be used to explain "alternative employment practice"
under the new statute.
If Watson could be used to determine what the term "alternative
employment practice" means in a subsection (ii) individual disparate
impact action, its impact would be significant. Justice O'Connor's
interpretation of the phrase in Watson conflicts with the earlier
meaning she quotes from Albemarle Paper.69 The Albemarle Paper
decision only required that the alternative practice "serve the
employer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship."7 ° In Watson, Justice O'Connor's interpretation makes
it more difficult for the plaintiff. Instead of merely requiring that the
employer's interests be served, Justice O'Connor would require
''alternative selection devices" to "be equally as effective as the
challenged practice in serving the employer's legitimate business
67. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (emphasis added) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
68. See id. at 982. A majority of the Court determined that disparate impact analysis
should apply to subjective employment criteria, but only three members of the Court
agreed with Justice O'Connor's opinion of alternative employment practices. See id. A
plurality opinion of four members of the Court is not "law." See Linda Novak, Note, The
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756 (1980).
Novak explains that:
Plurality decisions ... are those in which a majority of the Court agrees upon
the judgment but not upon a single rationale to support the result. Thus, there
is no "opinion of the Court" in the ordinary sense .... [P]lurality opinion"
... refer[s] to the opinion designated as the lead opinion of the Court, which
is not always the opinion subscribed to by the largest number of Justices.
Id. at 756 n.1.
The thrust of Novak's article is that a plurality decision of the Supreme Court requires a
lower court to interpret the precedential value to be given to the case. See id. A plurality
opinion is clearly authority with regard to the specific result of the case, but it is not
binding on dissimilar cases. See id at 758. The opinion may be influential, however,
on the subsequent development of the law in question. See id. Therefore, Watson's
authority is limited to its result, which established that subjective employment practices
are subject to disparate impact attack. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
69. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998; supra text accompanying note 37.
70. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
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goals."'" Even without Justice O'Connor's heightened interpretation,
it is difficult enough for a plaintiff to prove that an "alternative
employment practice" served the interests of the employer because
those interests are generally within the control and knowledge of the
employer. A heightened "equally effective" burden would make it a
comparative test, where the knowledge and control remain in the hands
of the employer. Employer's officials could easily testify that the
alternative does not equal the existing practice, while the plaintiff could
rarely find evidence to overcome such testimony. Thus, the exclusion
of Watson is very significant in determining the meaning of
"alternative employment practice."72
7 1. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
72. Subsection (C) limits the prevailing authority for determining the meaning of the
phrase "alternative employment practice" to cases decided before Wards Cove in order to
make clear that Wards Cove is not authoritative. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C)
(West 1994); supra note 57 and accompanying text. The use of a time cutoff to achieve
that end is strange in itself. Its use, however, raises another thorny problem. Requiring
that demonstration of an "alternative employment practice" must "be in accordance with
the law as it existed on June 4, 1989" appears to deprive every decision following that
date of precedential effect on the issue of what constitutes an alternative employment
practice. See id.
Since the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, there has been little action among the
lower federal courts concerning the meaning of subsection (ii) and the phrase
"alternative employment practice." In Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, the court assumed
that the three-step Albemarle Paper structure still applied. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d 1112,
1117-18 (lth Cir. 1993). Within that structure, the court described an alternative
employment practice as "alternative policies with lesser discriminatory effects that
would be comparably as effective at serving the employer's identified business needs."
Id. at 1118.
In Fitzpatrick, African-American firefighters challenged a fire department rule that
required all firefighters be clean-shaven. See id. at 1113. That rule had a disparate
impact on African-Americans because they were more likely than other groups to suffer
pseudofolliculitis barbae, a condition in which skin infections develop after shaving.
See id. at 1114. The court found that the no-beard rule was justified because respirators
must be tightly sealed to firefighters' faces to ensure their safety. See id. at 1119-20.
The plaintiffs did show that there had been no problems with the use of the respirators
when firefighters had earlier been allowed to "shadow shave." See id. at 1120-21. The
court, however, found that showing insufficient because no systematic study existed to
show the effect of "shadow shaving" had worked, especially considering that exposure
to even small amounts of toxic elements could, over time, be dangerous. See id. The
court also held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that an alternative employment practice
existed, stating that "any proposed less discriminatory alternatives to the no-beard rule
that would not require firefighters to be clean-shaven would not be adequately safe." Id.
at 1122.
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2. The Essence of the Albemarle Paper Test Applied in
Subsection (ii) Actions
If Wards Cove and Watson cannot be used to define "alternative
employment practice," Albemarle Paper must be the main source of
authority for the term. Even though the precise phrase "alternative
employment practice" does not appear in the case, Albemarle Paper
does address the concept of "alternative employment practice. 73
Additionally, Albemarle Paper is binding because it was decided
before June 4, 1989. Notably, Albemarle Paper describes the concept
by using the phrase "other tests or selection devices, without a
similarly undesirable racial effect, [that] would also serve the
employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy
workmanship."' 74 This showing would constitute "evidence that the
employer was using its tests [or selection devices] merely as a 'pretext'
for discrimination."7 Under Albemarle Paper's three-step litigation
structure, the issue of pretext or the existence of alternatives with less
drastic impact was relevant only after the plaintiff had proven that the
employer's practice had a discriminatory group impact and the
defendant had met its burden by justifying the practice as job related
and necessary for business. Therefore, this last chance for the plaintiff
implicated the employer's discriminatory state of mind through the use
of the term "pretext."
After the creation of two separate disparate impact causes of action
in the 1991 Act, the issue of "alternative employment practice" in a
subsection (ii) individual disparate impact action is no longer linked to
the issues of group disparate impact and employer justification of job
relatedness and business necessity. Congress also eliminated any
issue concerning the employer's discriminatory state of mind by
removing the idea of "pretext" from the concept of "alternative
employment practice." That being said, the essence of the concept in
subsection (ii) can still be traced to Albemarle Paper's focus on an
employment practice that serves the employer's interest in efficient and
trustworthy workmanship.76
73. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425.
74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. Id.
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a. Employer's State of Mind is Not an Element of a Subsection (ii)
Individual Disparate Impact Action
Albemarle Paper addresses the concept of alternative employment
practice in the final step of its three-step process.77 By using the word
"pretext," the Court introduces the employer's state of mind into a
disparate impact analysis.78 "Pretext" links the alternative practice with
less impact than the one the employer uses to its discriminatory state of
mind. The continued use of a practice that has a disparate impact when
a better alternative is available suggests that the employer is using its
practice because of, and not in spite of, its adverse impact on a group
protected by Title VII.79 In other words, the employer's continued use
of the challenged practice was a mere facade to hide a true goal of
discrimination. 0
Contrary to the Albemarle Paper decision, the new section 703(k)
includes neither the idea nor the language of "pretext" or "intent to
discriminate" to suggest that the employer's state of mind is relevant to
either subsection (i) or (ii) disparate impact actions.8' Thus, there is
77. Id.
78. As the law of individual disparate treatment discrimination makes clear, the term
pretext connotes intentional discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (explaining that the plaintiff in an individual
disparate treatment action has the opportunity to demonstrate that she was the victim of
intentional discrimination by proving that the employer's proffered reason for the
employment action was a pretext for the discrimination).
79. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("'Discriminatory
purpose, however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences . . . . It implies that the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.").
80. See Browne, supra note 9, at 364-65.
81. But see Browne, supra note 9, at 371-73. Professor Browne argues that the
second part of subsection (ii) - that the employer refuses to adopt the alternative -
incorporates employer state of mind and pretext into the subsection. See id. Based on
that, he then reads pretext back into the concept of "alternative employment practice"
in the first part of subsection (ii). See id.
Such a convoluted approach hardly seems consistent with a plain meaning approach.
See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. The more natural reading of subsection
(ii) is that the issue of the employer's refusal to adopt an available alternative is a factual
question that does not necessarily connote state of mind beyond the mere conscious
awareness of the existence of the alternative and the decision not to use it. Nothing in
subsection (ii) connotes that a discriminatory reason, motive, intent, or purpose for the
refusal is relevant. Even if it would, that only means that the state of mind issue had
been moved from the broader level of the "alternative employment practice" concept to
the more deeply imbedded refusal issue. It would not mean that pretext is an implicit part
of the phrase "alternative employment practice" in the first part of subsection (ii). See
supra note 24 (providing the text of the statute).
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no textual support for the incorporation of the state of mind element
into either subsection of the 1991 Act.82
In addition to the absence of any specific language that refers to
pretext or intentional discrimination in subsection (ii), two additional
examples illustrate that disparate impact analysis does not include the
employer's state of mind. This point is best articulated by a discussion
of two other sections of the 1991 Act.83 First, section 703(k)(3)
prohibits employers from implementing rules regarding drug use in
order to intentionally discriminate, but this section does not apply to
disparate impact cases. This section provides:
notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a rule
barring the employment of an individual who currently and
knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance . . . other
than the use or possession of a drug taken under the supervision
of a licensed health care professional, . . . shall be considered an
unlawful employment practice under this subchapter only if
such rule is adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.84
In enacting section 703(k)(3), Congress differentiated between
disparate impact analysis and analysis of intentional discrimination.
Without this section, employer rules regarding drug use would be
subject to attack under a disparate impact theory through the other
provision of new section 703(k). To prevent that from happening,
section 703(k)(3) limits the Title VII attack on these rules to disparate
treatment claims involving an intent to discriminate. If disparate
impact still included the intent to discriminate as an element or aspect,
section 703(k)(3) would need not exclude disparate impact theory from
being applied to employer drug rules. Section 703(k)(3) would be
rendered practically superfluous.85 Thus, section 703(k)(3) illustrates
82. In addition to the absence of textual support, Supreme Court case law also
supports the absence of intent from disparate impact actions. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating that the employer's good intentions or "absence
of discriminatory intent [did] not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms
that operate[d] as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and [were] unrelated to
measuring job capability.").
83. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(3) (West 1994) (enacted as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991); Id. § 1981a (enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991); ESKRIDGE,
supra note 14, app. 3 at 324 ("Each statutory provision should be read by reference to
the whole act.").
84. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(3) (emphasis added).
85. With section 703(k)(1)(A) creating two separate causes of action in subsections
(i) and (ii), employer drug rules could not be analyzed under the group disparate impact
approach of subsection (i) because that action does not include the concept of alternative
employment practice, much less pretext or any other notion implicating discriminatory
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that the disparate impact concept added to Title VII in the 1991 Act
does not include a state of mind or intent to discriminate element.
Second, new section 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, which provides
compensatory and punitive damages and a right to trial by jury in
intentional discrimination Title VII cases, makes clear that disparate
impact discrimination does not include the concept of intent to
discriminate.
In an action brought by a complaining party under Section 706
or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5) [42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-5 or 2000e-16] against a respondent who
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an
employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate
impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, or 2000e-3) [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2,
2000e-3 or 2000e-16], . . . the complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages .... 86
In sections 703(k)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, Congress specifically
excluded disparate impact discrimination from what it considered
intentional discrimination.87 In light of that fact, reading employer
state of mind into any part of subsection (ii) violates plain meaning.88
Thus, "alternative employment practice" under section 703(k)(1)(a)
neither includes pretext nor any other concept of a discriminatory state
of mind.89
intent. If intent to discriminate were found to play a role in individual disparate impact
claims under subsection (ii), then employer rules would presumably be subject to attack
under that approach because section 703(k)(3)'s intent requirement would be satisfied.
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a. This section also establishes a right to trial by jury. See
id.
87. It might be suggested that, before the 1991 Act, the disparate impact concept of
discrimination had frequently been described as not involving intentional
discrimination, despite its presence in the third, pretext step of Albemarle Paper. See,
e.g., International Bhd of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977)
(stating that disparate impact "involve[s] employment practices that are facially neutral
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity . . . . Proof of discriminatory
motive . . . is not required under a disparate-impact theory."). Nevertheless, the plain
meaning of sections 703(k) and 1981a is that intent to discriminate is not a part of a
section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii) cause of action.
88. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, app. 3 at 324 (footnotes omitted) ("Avoid
interpreting a provision in a way that is inconsistent with a necessary assumption of
another provision.").
89. If, however, a plaintiff found evidence that the employer did in fact use an
employment practice, even one neutral on its face, because of its discriminatory impact,
the practice could be attacked as intentional disparate treatment discrimination. Merely
adopting a policy that is neutral on its face but has a disparate impact would not be
1999]
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b. Group Disparate Impact Is Not an Element of a Subsection (ii)
Action
Until the enactment of section 703(k) in the 1991 Act, disparate
impact law mainly focused on the impact of employer practices upon
groups protected by Title VII. Supreme Court case law preceding the
1991 Act reflects the early disparate impact focus on Title VII groups.
For example, the standardized tests and educational prerequisites in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. excluded more African-Americans than
Whites from transferring to better jobs at the Duke Power Company.9"
Additionally, height and weight prerequisites in Dothard v.
Rawlinson9' excluded more women than men from prison guard jobs
in Alabama. With the enactment of section 703(k)(1)(A), Congress
limited the need to show group impact to subsection (i) actions - "a
complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."92 Subsection (ii) does
not include this element, therefore, its plain meaning dictates that the
plaintiff need not prove disparate impact on a group protected by Title
VII. Rather, subsection (ii) only focuses on the existence of an
alternative employment practice and the employer's refusal to adopt
it.
93
This point raises a second difference, in addition to the earlier
discussed exclusion of pretext, between subsection (ii) and the
Albemarle Paper structure.94 In Albemarle Paper, alternative practices
only arose after the plaintiff proved that the challenged practice had a
disparate impact on a protected group and the defendant proved that
business necessity justified the practice.95 As discussed earlier, the
structure of section 703(k)(1)(A) is fundamentally different from the
Albemarle Paper structure because the separation of subsection (i)
sufficient evidence from which to draw an inference that the practice was adopted by the
employer in order to discriminate.
90. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-8 (1971) (holding that promotion
requirements had a disparate impact on black employees).
91. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
92. 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-(k)(1)(A)(i) (West 1994).
93. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing subsection (ii)
requirements).
94. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Note again, that
continual reference to Albemarle Paper arises because it represents the state of disparate
impact law prior to the 1991 Act.
95. See id.
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from (ii) creates two separate causes of action. 96 Consequently,
liability under subsection (ii) arises without regard to any subsection
(i) issue, including the group impact issue.
Despite this analysis, several arguments have been made that group
disparate impact remains an element of subsection (ii) actions. Critics
base this argument on the fact that although the language "disparate
impact" is not expressly included in subsection (ii), the words
"disparate impact" do appear in the opening phrase of section
703(k)(1)(A): "An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this subchapter only if .... ,9' From this,
it is argued that the phrase "disparate impact" should be incorporated
as an element into subsection (ii) actions. This approach is flawed
because the term "disparate impact" is also included within the
substance of the subsection (i) group disparate impact action.98 It is
not, however, included within the substance of the subsection (ii)
individual disparate impact action.99 Giving substantive meaning to
the term "disparate impact" twice in subsection (i) actions, based on
the term in the opening phrase and again within subsection (i), would
seem to make one of those uses superfluous. This redundancy
violates plain meaning guidelines.'0 0 Specifically, if Congress
intended to incorporate group "disparate impact" from the opening
phrase of 703(k)(1)(A) into the substance of both subsections (i) and
(ii), it would have been unnecessary to separately include this phrase
within the substance of subsection (i).
Rejecting the argument that incorporation of the phrase into both
subsections makes the phrase in the opening unnecessary is also
flawed. It is flawed because the language "disparate impact" in the
opening phrase of section 703(k)(1)(A) for the first time legitimates the
concept of disparate impact discrimination with statutory terms. This
ended a long-standing debate concerning the legitimacy of disparate
impact discrimination as an unlawful employment practice under Title
96. See supra text accompanying notes 24-43.
97. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
98. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (providing "disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
99. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (stating "the complaining party makes the
demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.").
100. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, app. 3 at 324 (footnotes omitted) ("Avoid
interpreting a provision in a way that would render other provisions of the act
superfluous or unnecessary.").
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VII. l0 ' "Disparate impact" was included in the opening phrase of
section 703(k)(1)(A) to differentiate liability in both of the new section
703(k) actions from the preexisting actions available under sections
703(a) through (d), 10 2 and 701(j). 103
A second argument for reading a group disparate impact element
into a subsection (ii) individual disparate impact action arises from
language in Albemarle Paper that states that the "other tests or selection
devices" that plaintiff proposes must be "without a similarly
undesirable racial effect."1 °4  Here it is argued that the word
"similarly"'0 5 is a comparative term that requires the plaintiff's
proposed alternative employment practice to have less of an
undesirable effect than the challenged practice. The effect necessary
for this comparison is the effect on a group protected by Title VII.
Thus, group disparate impact is read back into subsection (ii)
individual disparate impact actions by reading an embedded group
disparate impact element into the term "alternative employment
practice."
This argument is also flawed because it depends on the survival of
the Albemarle Paper three-step process after the enactment of section
703(k) in the 1991 Act. 106 Congress, however, fundamentally
101. The disparate impact theory of discrimination had been criticized before passage
of the 1991 Act because Title VII did not specifically include the term "disparate
impact." See Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and
Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a
Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 432-39 (1985); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
184-200 (1992).
102. Section 703(a) sets out liability for employers, (b) for employment agencies,
(c) for unions and (d) for training programs. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)-(d).
103. Section 7010) sets out liability for the failure to reasonably accommodate the
religious observances, practices and beliefs of employees. See id. § 2000e(j).
104. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
105. "Similar" is defined as "having characteristics in common ... comparable ...
one that resembles another ... counterpart." See WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 2120.
106. See Alito, supra note 27, at 1037-38. Despite concluding that subsection (ii)
creates a cause of action separate from a subsection (i) action, Rosemary Alito argues
that "logic" requires the plaintiff prove the disparate impact as part of establishing
liability under subsection (ii). See id. at 1038-39. "To make any showing similar to the
established alternative practice rebuttal, some proof as to the impact of the challenged
practice must be made; otherwise it would be impossible to demonstrate that the
proposed alternative had less of an impact." Id. This is another example of where the
commentator's primary focus is on preexisting law with the new statute being
interpreted to fit into that law. The plain meaning approach reverses that sequence, the
primary focus is on the terms of the statute while prior law is only sometimes helpful to
determine the statutory terms mean.
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changed that structure by enacting section 703(k)(1)(A). The first two
steps of the Albemarle Paper structure have been broken off from the
third and made into the subsection (i) group disparate impact action.
The third step then stands free of subsection (i) as the independent
subsection (ii) action for individual disparate impact.' °7 Because plain
meaning mandates the conclusion that subsections (i) and (ii) create
separate causes of action, the real issue arises over the meaning of
"alternative" for purposes of a subsection (ii) individual disparate
impact action.'08
A plain meaning analysis of the term "alternative" makes clear that
the group effect is not included under subsection (ii) actions. As
Webster's makes clear, "alternative" connotes "a proposition or
situation offering a choice between two things wherein if one thing is
chosen the other is rejected."'0 9 Thus, when subsection (ii) uses the
term "alternative," plain meaning requires that it be an alternative to
some other employment practice." 0 The other employment practice is
the defendant's challenged practice. Merely identifying the employ-
ment practice, however, does not include the notion that the
employer's use of it has been shown to have a disparate impact a
group protected by Title VII.
This interpretation satisfies plain meaning because it is not absurd to
conclude that "alternative" in subsection (ii) refers to the employment
practice that the employer relied upon in adversely affecting the
plaintiff. In other words, it is an impact on the individual. Showing
that the defendant's employment practice had an adverse impact on the
plaintiff does not necessarily include a showing that the practice the
plaintiff challenges had a disparate impact on a group protected by Title
VII. Thus, the term "alternative" has a reasonable function in
subsection (ii) without any need to incorporate a showing of group
disparate impact. Finally, this meaning is consistent with the
separation of subsections (i) and (ii) into separate causes of action with
the showing of group disparate impact limited by the terms of the
statute to subsection (i) actions.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 24-43 (explaining the new disparate impact
action under subsection (ii)).
108. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, app. 3 at 323 (footnotes omitted) (suggesting that
a provision be interpreted so as not to "render [anlother provision of the act superfluous
or unnecessary.").
109. WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 63.
110. Plain meaning governs if a term can be given meaning that is not absurd. See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, app. 3 at 323 (footnotes omitted) ("Follow the plain meaning
of the statutory text, except when text suggests an absurd result .... ").
1999] 495
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
In other words, Congress drafted section 703(k)(1)(A) to break
apart the three-step Albemarle Paper structure into two separate causes
of action. It removed the group impact from the concept of "alternative
employment practice" in the subsection (ii) action. The plain meaning
of the term is that the plaintiff must show the existence of an
employment practice that is an alternative to the one the employer used
to adversely affect her."' If she shows an adverse effect caused by an
employment practice, that she would not be adversely affected by the
proposed alternative practice and that the alternative serves the
legitimate interests of the employer, she has established the first part of
a section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii) cause of action.' 2
3. Subsection (ii) Individual Disparate Impact Actions Involve Two
Employment Practices
Every subsection (ii) action involves two employment practices.
The first is the employment practice of the employer that adversely
affected the plaintiff. The second is the alternative employment
practice the plaintiff proposes. Presumably, the definition of an
employment practice is the same whether the focus is on the
defendant's challenged practice or on the plaintiff's proposed
alternative." 3 It is important to define the substantive meaning of this
term ''employment practice." The definitions of "practice" in
Webster's that best fit the context of the word used in subsection (ii)
are: "the usual mode or method of doing something" or "to do or
perform often, customarily or habitually."'"1 4 Presumably, the plaintiff
111. Section 706(f)(1) defines who may bring a Title VII action as a "person
claiming to be aggrieved." See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (West 1994). A person
adversely affected by the employer's use of an employment practice is a "person
claiming to be aggrieved." Id. § 2000e-5(b). She, therefore, has standing to bring a
subsection (ii) individual disparate impact action. See 1 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LMGATION § 13.3 (1997).
112. If the plaintiff also shows that the employer refuses to adopt her alternative, she
proves a violation of section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii). See infra text accompanying notes 148-
64 (describing the requirement that the plaintiff show the employer refused to adopt the
alternative).
113. Section 703(k)(1)(C) sets a cutoff date, June 4, 1989, for authority for the
"concept of 'alternative employment practice."' See supra text accompanying notes 58-
72 (explaining the effect of the cut-off date). If "employment practice" means the same
for the practice the plaintiff challenges as for the alternative she proposes, it may be
argued that the cutoff date operates to limit the authority for "employment practice" as it
limits authority for the meaning of "alternative employment practice."
114. WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 1781. Webster's defines "employment" as "work
(as customary trade, craft, service, or vocation) in which one's labor or services are paid
for by an employer." WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 743.
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can make out a case that the defendant's act that affected her adversely
is an employment practice if there is evidence that the action is
consistent with the way the defendant usually operates and is not ad
hoc or idiosyncratic." 5 To prove an alternative employment policy
exists, the plaintiff must also show that other employers either did or
could act regularly on the basis of this proposed practice. It is not
enough to show that an employer could act on it in some exceptional
situations.
Until the Wards Cove decision in 1989,116 in every disparate impact
case the Supreme Court found that the challenged practice was an
employment practice. Thus, standardized written tests," 7 educational
prerequisites," 8 height and weight prerequisites,' 19 and employer rules
that prohibited the employment of anyone on methadone
maintenance12 were all deemed "employment practices" under
115. From the plaintiffs point of view, this is a situation where the adage, "Never do
anything the first time," pays off. If the employer follows its normal practice, it is
using an employment practice. Employers would have an incentive to argue that the
action the plaintiff challenges was not based on a policy or practice but instead was ad
hoc. Ad hoc refers to a first time action: an action based on a specific reason or only
used for a specific circumstance.
116. In Wards Cove, the Court rejected the attempt to attack the "bottom line" of the
employer's workforce statistics using the disparate impact theory, instead requiring the
plaintiff to identify a particular employment practice that caused the disparate impact.
See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989) ("Just as an
employer cannot escape liability under Title VII by demonstrating that, at the bottom
line, his work force is racially balanced .... a Title VII plaintiff does not make out a case
of disparate impact simply by showing that, at the bottom line, there is racial imbalance
in the work force.").
117. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1982) (explaining that aptitude
tests required for promotion violated Title VII as they adversely impacted black
employees); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1976) (finding that pre-hire
testing did not adversely affect black applicants); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 410-11 (1975) (ruling that standardized tests required for hiring constituted
discrimination on the basis of disparate impact); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971) (holding that promotion requirements in the form of test score
prerequisites had a disparate impact on black employees).
118. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
119. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1977) (finding female
applicants for corrections officer positions stated prima a facie case when national
statistics showed Alabama's height and weight requirements for such positions excluded
over 40% of female applicants but less than 1% of male applicants).
120. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583-87 (1979)
(holding that transit authority's policy of excluding methadone users did not violate
Title VII, even if statistics showed disparate impact on minorities, because transit
authority established policy was job related). The 1991 Act added a new section,
703(k)(3), which exempts employer rules concerning use of illegal drugs from disparate
impact attack. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(3) (West 1994). Since the methadone
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disparate impact discrimination law. In 1988, the United States
Supreme Court even went so far as to conclude that an employer's
reliance upon the subjective judgment of its supervisors to determine
promotions was an employment practice for purposes of disparate
impact law. 2 ' In so holding, it stated that "disparate impact analysis is
in principle no less applicable to subjective employment criteria than to
objective or standardized tests."'2
Prior to the 1991 Act, however, the lower courts limited the scope
of the term "employment practice" under disparate impact law. First,
the Seventh Circuit found that a change in fringe benefits was not an
"employment practice" subject to disparate impact attack under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. 23 In Finnegan v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. 2 4 an employer in economic difficulty capped all
employee paid vacation at four weeks per year.1 25 Prior to this cap,
vacation benefits increased with seniority; therefore the cap adversely
affected older workers. 26 Specifically, this had a disparate impact on
older workers who, as a group, generally had more seniority with the
company than the group of younger workers.1 27 In stating that "this
case makes no sense in disparate impact terms," Judge Posner held
disparate impact inapplicable without exactly basing the decision on
whether or not the fringe benefit change was an employment
practice.1 28  Consequently, the court did not allow a Title VII
maintenance rule at issue in Beazer involved the legal use of drugs, that rule would fall
within the disparate impact analysis of section 703(k)(3).
121. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
122. Id. at 990; see also Miriam A. Cherry, Note, Not-So Arbitrary Arbitration:
Using Title Vii's Disparate Impact Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts That
Discriminate, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 298-304 (1998) (discussing the
applicability of disparate impact analysis to the securities industry's employment
practice of requiring mandatory arbitration of employment disputes).
123. See Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (7th Cir.
1992) (construing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634
(West 1985 & West Supp. 1998)).
124. Finnegan, 967 F.2d at 1161.
125. See id. at 1162 (noting that prior to the reduction, employees who had at least
16 years of service were entitled to between four and seven weeks of paid vacation).
126. See id.
127. See id. (noting that most of the workers having 16 years or more of service were
at least 40 years old).
128. Id. at 1163. Judge Posner never actually said that a change in fringe benefits
was not an "employment practice" but that seems to be the import of his following
remarks:
A company that for legitimate business reasons decides to cut wages across the
board, or to cut out dental insurance, or to curtail the use of company cars is
not required to conduct a study to determine the impact of the measure on
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analysis.'2 9
employees grouped by age and if it is non random to prove that the same
amount of money could not have been saved in some different fashion.
Id.
Subsequently, the same court decided that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
requires proof of motive, and thus mere disparate impact cannot be a premise for Age
Discrimination in Employment Act liability. See EEOC v. Francis Parker Sch., 41 F.3d
1073, 1076-77 (7th Cir. 1994) (declining to employ disparate impact analysis to
school's policy of hiring inexperienced-and thus younger-teachers in an effort to
decrease salary expenses); see also Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards
Cove Packing? That is Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the
Age Discrimination Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 842-44 (1997) (stating
that the court in Francis W. Parker School should have reached the same result under a
disparate impact analysis since the employer's economic efficiency may have
constituted a "reasonable" factor other than age, and, thus, would not be unlawful under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). It may be that Finnegan is merely a
poorly articulated foreshadowing of Francis W. Parker School. If so, Finnegan may not
be saying anything about "employment practices."
129. Had Finnegan been a Title VII case, a way to rationalize the result is to analyze
it as a section 703(a)(1) case, the language of which differs from section 703(a)(2) and
which might be the basis for finding disparate impact inappropriate. Section 703(a)(1)
makes it unlawful for the employer to "fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West
1994) (emphasis added). If fringe benefits are considered a "condition of employment,"
the use of the word "discriminate" could be limited to intentional discrimination. In
contrast section 703(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an employer "to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee." Id. § 2002-2(a)(2) (emphasis added). The "tend to"
and "adversely effect" language supports the connotation of disparate impact and is not
limited to intentional discrimination. But see Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480,
1489,1489-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (analyzing employer practice of requiring bilingual
employees to speak English on the job as a section 703(a)(1) issue that is nevertheless
subject to disparate impact analysis).
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Second, the scope of employment practice is limited by the meaning
extended to "practice." "Practice" connotes an active decision by an
employer to do something in some way. A mere passive response by
the employer to outside stimuli is not an employment practice. Thus,
at issue in the second limitation is the employer's active practice and its
mere passive response. In EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp
Works, 130 the employer hired walk-in applicants who heard about job
openings from incumbent workers. 31 According to Judge Posner, the
disparate impact theory again did not apply because there was no
"employer practice."1 32 Rather, this was the employer's mere passive
acceptance of a practice that included its non-supervisory employees
telling their families, friends and acquaintances that the employer was
looking to hire new employees. 33 "The [district] court erred in
considering passive reliance on employee word-of-mouth recruiting as
a particular employment practice for the purposes of disparate
impact."'' 34 Yet, this opinion is arguable because while it may be true
that the employer did not establish a "policy' ' 35 of word-of-mouth
recruitment, it is much harder to conclude that the employer did not
have a "practice" of hiring by word-of-mouth because that is how, as a
matter of course, employees were hired.
In sum, "employment practice" is a very broadly defined term. The
breadth of its definition allows a plaintiff to prove rather easily that the
employer's adverse action 131 was based on an "employment
130. EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 47 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991).
1 31. See id. at 295 (noting that employees by "word-of-mouth" would tell their
friends and relatives to come to the office to fill out an application).
132. See id. at 305.
133. See id.
134. Id. (explaining the practices instead were undertaken "solely by employees").
135. Webster's defines "policy" as "a definite course or method of action selected ...
from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and usually
determine present and future decisions." WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 1754.
136. "Adverseness" is occasionally at issue. Generally, plaintiffs only challenge
employer practices in claims of national origin discrimination dealing with language
issues. In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), the plaintiff
challenged an employment requirement that bilingual workers speak only English while
working. See id. at 1486-87. The Ninth Circuit held that, although the challenged
policy had an impact, that impact was not adverse because the plaintiffs could easily
speak both English and Spanish. See id. at 1487. Requiring bilingual employees to
speak English was not adverse treatment because it was not a burden to the employees.
See id. at 1487-88. Specifically, the court said:
When the privilege [of self-expression] is defined at its narrowest (as merely
the ability to speak on the job), we cannot conclude that those employees
fluent in both English and Spanish are adversely impacted by the policy.
Because they are able to speak English, bilingual employees can engage in
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practice. '37 Further, it allows a plaintiff to look broadly for an
alternative employment practice that would not affect her adversely but
would serve the employer's legitimate interests. 38
5. All Persons Are Protected Against Individual Disparate Impact
Discrimination
Title VII protects all persons against employment discrimination
because of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.13 That
protection extends to disparate treatment discrimination. Yet, section
703(k) does not address whether all persons, including males and
whites, are protected against disparate impact discrimination. 40
Therefore, the plain meaning of subsection (ii) supports the conclusion
that, like Title VII's prohibition against disparate treatment, the
protection against individual disparate impact discrimination extends to
all workers, whether or not they belong to a group specially protected
by Title VII. Countervailing authority under earlier disparate impact
law, however, provides that disparate impact protects against
discrimination based on gender, religion, national origin, or minority
membership that is specially protected under Title VII. Arguably, this
protection does not extend to males and whites. Two arguments best
illustrate this point. First, every disparate impact case decided by
Supreme Court has involved claims by women or minority men. 4' In
conversation on the job.
Id.
137. See supra notes 113-135 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of the
term "employment practice").
138. See id. The sources of employment practices that the plaintiff may want to
propose as alternatives include what other employers actually do in similar situations,
what courts have found to be employment practices, academic and other literature on
human resources management, as well as the testimony of academics, consultants and
others who are qualified to testify on what is an employment practice.
139. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80
(1976) (stating Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against all races, whether
whites or non-whites).
140. See supra note 31, 35 and accompanying text (providing the text of section
703(k)(1)(A).
141. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647 (1989);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 983 (1988). The closest the
Supreme Court has come to addressing other groups under disparate impact was in
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., where the Court addressed whether alienage was
national origin discrimination. 414 U.S. 86 (1973). The Court held that discrimination
based on alienage does not violate the Civil Rights Act. Specifically, in Espinoza, the
Court found that discrimination was not based on origin because the individual was not
yet a citizen. This holding, however, noted in dicta that if discrimination occurs based
on national origin a disparate impact cause of action does arise. See id. at 90.
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court emphasized that Title VII
sought "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees.' 42 Second, in City of Los
Angeles v. Manhart, the Court suggested that the disparate impact
theory was not available to men. 43 In deciding whether equalizing
pension benefits and contributions for men and women would have a
disparate impact on men who, as a group, do not live as long as
women, the Court, in a footnote, addressed the defendant's claim that
a gender neutral plan would have a "disproportionately heavy impact
on male employees."'" The Court said that "male employees would
not prevail. Even a completely neutral practice will inevitably have
some disproportionate impact on one group or another. Griggs does
not imply, and this Court has never held, that discrimination must
always be inferred from such consequences."' 45
The most powerful reason advanced to limit individual disparate
impact protection to members of groups historically victimized by
employment discrimination, is that otherwise, every employment
practice that adversely affects any worker is vulnerable to a subsection
(ii) individual disparate impact action. To prevail under subsection
(ii), plaintiffs would only need to show that an alternative employment
practice existed that would not adversely affect the plaintiff and that the
employer refused to adopt it. This creates an intrusive outcome that
damages the operation of business. To extend individual disparate
impact protection to all workers would establish a general standard of
job security almost as protective as the just cause standard found in
collective bargaining agreements and in some other employment
situations. 146 Plain meaning, however, would require Congress, not
142. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
143. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
144. Id. at 710-11 n.20.
145. See id.
146. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 22 (4th ed. 1997). Zimmer provided an overview of the "just cause"
standard):
[J]ust cause protection has two different forms. The first is cause related to the
individual in question and focuses on such factors as inadequate job
performance, disloyalty, and misconduct or violence. Further, adequate job
performance most probably includes regular attendance, a reasonable quantity
and quality of work, and obedience to rules, at least reasonable ones, for work
performance. But the question is not necessarily "fault." An employee who is
repeatedly sick might be subject to discharge no matter how authentic her
illness. The second form of just cause focuses on systemic causes related to
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the interpreting court, to change section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii) to reflect that
policy. 
1 7
In sum, the first part of subsection (ii) requires that the plaintiff
prove that she was adversely affected by an "employment practice,"
that an alternative practice exists, and that this alternative both would
not adversely affect the plaintiff and would serve the employer's
legitimate interests. The second part of subsection (ii) individual
disparate impact action requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer
refused to adopt her proposed alternative employment practice
C. The Employer "Refuses" to Adopt the Alternative Employment
Practice Plaintiff Proposes
The plaintiff bears the burden of production and persuasion on both
parts of a subsection (ii) individual disparate impact action.148
Therefore, in addition to proving the existence of an alternative
employment practice, the plaintiff must also show that the employer
"refuses" to adopt the proposed alternative employment practice.
Webster's defines the word "refuse" as "to show or express a positive
the business, typically involving a large-scale termination of employees in
the context of a reorganization or a reduction in force during an economic
downturn, including, at the extreme, shutting down entire departments or even
plants.
Id. (citation omitted).
While most of the issues associated with just cause could be cast as the employer's use
of an employment practice, the individual disparate impact approach requires a plaintiff
to also prove the existence of another, alternative employment practice that would not
affect her adversely and that would also serve the employer's interests. Because it may
be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that an alternative exists, the individual disparate
impact would not be as broadly protective as the just cause standard.
147. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing the plain meaning
approach).
148. See supra Part H.A. (discussing the burden of persuasion in actions brought
under section 703(k)(l)(A)(ii)).
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unwillingness to do or comply with .... ,149 According to this
meaning, the word "refuse" includes more than the mere failure to use
the proposed alternative practice. At a minimum, it connotes the
employer's awareness of an alternative practice and a conscious
decision to reject it.150 Further, while "refuse" marks a single moment
in time, subsection (ii) actually uses the word "refuses." "Refuses"
signifies a continuing refusal to adopt the proposed alternative. As
later discussed,151 this continuing refusal may include at least a future
possibility that the employer could change its mind and adopt the
policy. If the employer does adopt the proposed alternative practice, it
could then no longer be said that the employer "refuses" to adopt the
policy.
This refusal element raises several issues. The first concerns the
relationship between the refusal element and the first part of subsection
(ii). 152 Professor Browne, a critic of Title VII, argues that these two
parts are related because both are necessary to establish pretext. 153
Specifically, evidence that an employer knows of a less adverse
alternative but refuses to adopt it, supports the inference that the
employer used the challenged practice that was neutral on its face as to
race or gender to nevertheless hide its intentional discrimination.
Thus, under his argument pretext and intentional discrimination remain
relevant in section 703(k) disparate impact actions. That approach,
however, runs counter to the plain meaning of subsection (ii)
individual disparate impact actions because neither pretext nor intent to
discriminate exist within the subsection.154
149. WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 1910.
150. Such awareness may involve intent in some sense but it does not necessarily
include discriminatory intent. That would only be implicated if there was evidence to
support a reasonable inference that the employer refused to adopt the alternative because
it used the challenged practice for its discriminatory effect. See Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979) (finding Massachusetts' preference for hiring
veterans in civil service positions not unlawful, even though practice had adverse
impact on women, as to have "discriminatory purpose" employer must act "because of'
not "in spite of' adverse effects).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 159-161 (discussing effect of word "refuses"
in statute).
152. The first part of subsection (ii) provides: "the complaining party makes the
demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment
practice .... " 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (West 1994).
153. See Browne, supra note 9, at 373.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 77-89 (discussing pretext under section
703(k)(1)(A)(ii)).
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Plain meaning further rejects a second argument. Rosemary Alito
seems to assume that, when an employer refuses to adopt the
alternative, the employer not only knows the existence of the proposed
alternative, but also knows that the challenged current practice or
policy causes a disparate impact.155 This argument depends upon the
duty to show the employer's knowledge of disparate impact in a
subsection (ii) cause of action. The plain meaning, however, of
subsection (ii) does not include this element. 56  Rather, the
employer's knowledge about the existence of an alternative
employment practice and its refusal to use it are relevant.
Further, Alito seems to assume that subsection (ii) is violated only if
the plaintiff has specifically proposed the alternative to the employer
who then refuses to adopt it.' 57 While typically this refusal is only
manifested after the plaintiff has suggested her proposed alternative,
section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii) language does not require the plaintiff to show
that she proposed the alternative to the employer who then refuses to
adopt it. Under plain meaning, subsection (ii) is violated when the
employer knows of the alternative, from whatever source (including
but not limited to plaintiff's proposal of it), and refuses to adopt it.
The source who reveals this alternative is not relevant in a subsection
(ii) individual disparate impact action.
To elaborate, the first part of subsection (ii), that the plaintiff prove
the existence of an alternative practice, and the second part, the
employer's refusal to adopt it ; are joined by the word "and." The use
of "and" makes clear that the plaintiff must prove both parts to
155. See Alito, supra note 27, at 1040. In the context of alternative employment
practices, Alito described the burden of proof:
[An] open question with respect to the alternative practice mode of proof is
precisely when a plaintiff must reveal the availability of the purported
alternative, and when a defendant will be deemed to have refused to adopt it. In
some respects it would seem preferable for the plaintiff to make his showing at
the time of filing the charge or even before filing where possible. This course
would have the clear advantage of affording the employer a real opportunity to
consider and adopt the alternative, outside the combative atmosphere of
litigation and without the expense litigation entails for all concerned. The
difficulty with this course, on the other hand, is the likely inability of a
plaintiff to make a showing of disparate impact sufficient to convince an
employer that an alteration of his practices is necessary without the aid of an
EEOC investigation or pretrial discovery. Moreover, in the absence of a
satisfactory showing of disparate impact, the employer should not be
penalized for a refusal to adopt the alternative.
Id.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 77-89.
157. See supra note 155.
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establish liability. 5 The two parts of subsection (ii) are only linked
by the fact that both parts must be proved by the plaintiff. Each is a
simple factual question. Neither pretext nor disparate impact plays any
role in the proof of a subsection (ii) action. Rather, the refusal element
seems straightforward: knowing the existence of the alternative, the
employer refuses to use it.
Congress' choice of the word "refuses" rather than "refused" in
subsection (ii) is problematic. It seems clear that once the employer is
aware of the alternative employment practice but decides not to use it,
it can be said the employer "refuses" to use the alternative. At that
point, the refusal issue of a subsection (ii) individual disparate action is
satisfied. Yet, it is problematic because it may be only conditionally
satisfied. The employer can change its mind, adopt the alternative and
undermine the subsection (ii) violation. It is undermined because it is
no longer true that the employer "refuses" to adopt the plaintiff's
proposed practice.'59 Under subsection (ii)'s literal meaning, an
employer could steadfastly refuse to adopt the plaintiff's proposed
alternative until the verge of trial, during trial, or even after trial.1
60
This late adoption by the employer may then undermine the plaintiff's
case because once the employer uses the practice it is no longer true
that the defendant "refuses" to adopt the alternative. Therefore, the
plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case.
This problem is best illustrated through the difference between
undermining a plaintiff s case and rendering a plaintiff's case moot. In
general litigation law, a defendant can, at any point before final
judgment, end the litigation by providing a full remedy to the plaintiff.
This full remedy renders the action moot. If subsection (ii) used the
word "refused," the employer could moot the action if it put the
plaintiff in the situation she would have been in if the defendant never
158. Webster's defines "and" as "along with, or together with" and "added to or
linked to." WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 80.
159. One effect of this odd choice of words by Congress is that the use of "refuses"
reinforces the plain meaning conclusion that the two parts of subsection (ii) are separate
factual questions that are not closely linked to each other. While the employer must
have known of the existence of the alternative for one to be able to conclude the
employer refused to adopt such alternative, the exact factual issue is that the employer
"refuses" to adopt it. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text. A refusal at one
point in time is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a subsection (ii) action
because of the possibility that the employer could later change course and adopt the
practice it had previously decided not to use. At that point, it can no longer be said that
the employer still "refuses" to adopt it and so subsection (ii) is no longer violated.
160. Presumably, after final judgment against a defendant, a change of mind of the
defendant would be too late to effect the validity of the judgment.
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used its employment practice to her disadvantage. Nonetheless,
because Congress used the word "refuses," the employer can
undermine the plaintiff's case at any time until judgment in her case
becomes final.
Plain meaning supports the regular use of language if its use is not
absurd or clearly a slip of the scrivener's pen.' 6' To define a cause of
action so that the defendant can undermine a plaintiff's case at any
point until final judgment is unusual, maybe even unprecedented, but it
is not necessarily absurd. While one goal of anti-discrimination law is
to make victims whole, 62 another goal is to break down barriers to
equal employment opportunity. 163 The plain meaning interpretation of
subsection (ii)'s "refuses" language would serve this latter goal, even
if the goal of making victims whole is not fully satisfied. It would be
difficult to find the situation absurd where the odd use of the word
"refuses" nevertheless satisfies one goal of a law, even if it does not
meet all of a law's purported goals. A stronger case, however, may be
made that the use of "refuses" rather than "refused" is a scrivener's
error since the use of "refuses" or "refusal" involves the change of
only one letter in one word. 164  Regardless of this argument,
subsection (ii) makes sense despite the use of "refuses" in its ordinary
sense.
III. RELATING A SUBSECTION (ii) INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE IMPACT
CASE WITH OTHER TITLE VII CLAIMS
Suppose Alex Wesley is discharged by Cytron Incorporated
allegedly because of excessive tardiness. How would Alex's
discharge be analyzed under various theories of discrimination,
including the new subsection (ii) individual disparate impact action?
161. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, app. 3 at 323 (footnotes omitted) (stating that the
plain meaning canon mandates "[flollowing the plain meaning of the statutory text,
except when text suggests an absurd result or a scrivener's error."); see also supra notes
13-17 and accompanying text.
162. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (noting that one
purpose of Title VII is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination.").
163. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (explaining that
the objective of Congress in enacting Title VII was "to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated to favor an identifiable group of
white employees.").
164. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989) (Scalia,
J. concurring) (interpreting a Federal Rule of Evidence as if Congress had inadvertently
left out the qualification "criminal" as modifying "defendant").
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A. A Subsection (i) Group Disparate Impact Action
Under a subsection (i) group disparate impact action, to qualify for a
group disparate impact action Wesley would likely need to be a woman
or a minority male. 165 Cytron's excessive tardiness discharge policy
or practice is an employment practice for disparate impact purposes.66
Wesley, however, would have to show that she is a member of a Title
VII protected group and that this practice had a disparate impact on his
group.167 If Wesley is within one of these groups, more specifically if
she is a minority and from a lower income household, her action is
more likely to succeed because data is available to support the fact that
people with lower incomes have more trouble with child care and
transportation given their economic status. If a prima facie case were
established, then the group disparate impact case would depend upon
Cytron's ability to prove that its excessive tardiness discharge practice
was job related and consistent with business necessity. 168 The regular
and timely attendance of workers is a business necessity. Therefore,
at issue is whether the tardiness discharge policy is "job related for the
position in question." While perfect attendance is not necessary for
some jobs, the employer's practice of discharging for excessive
tardiness would still likely qualify as "job related." Accordingly,
Wesley would probably lose a subsection (i) group disparate impact
action.
B. An Individual Disparate Treatment Action
Title VII protects all workers from employment discrimination.
169
Theoretically, Wesley has an individual disparate treatment action
regardless of his or her class status under Title VII. As intent to
discriminate is the key element of a disparate treatment action,
170
Wesley would have to introduce evidence sufficient for a fact finder to
165. See supra text accompanying notes 139-147 (noting the historic limitation of
disparate impact protection to women and minorities).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 116-138 (providing a discussion of the
meaning of the term "employment practice").
167. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93 (discussing early disparate impact
focus on Title VII groups).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 29 (noting employer's burden to
establish employment practice was job related and consistent with business necessity).
169. See supra text accompanying note 139 (stating Title VII's coverage).
170. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993) (stating that, in a
Title VII disparate treatment case, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion
on the issue of the employer's intent to discriminate, and that it is not enough to show
that the employer's reason for the adverse employment action is not credible).
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infer that Wesley was discharged because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Absent "smoking gun" evidence that Cytron fired
Wesley because of race, gender or other basis proscribed by Title
VII, 7 ' success will be difficult. Some evidence to overcome these
obstacles may exist if Wesley is a member of a group historically
victimized by discrimination. 172 Additionally, evidence, such as proof
that some white male workers were excessively tardy but were not
discharged, is also helpful. This uphill battle might be successful if a
trier could conclude that the excessive tardiness discharge was in fact a
pretext for discrimination.
While proof of an individual disparate treatment claim may prove
daunting, the 1991 Act added incentives for plaintiffs to cast their
claims as intentional discrimination. This is true because new section
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides compensatory and punitive damages,
subject to caps, as well as the right to a trial by jury, in Title VII claims
against a defendant "who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination . . . .,,17' This right does not accrue where disparate
impact renders an employment practice unlawful.
C. A Subsection (ii) Individual Disparate Impact Action
Although compensatory and punitive damages are not available in a
subsection (ii) individual disparate impact action, this action is not
without incentives. Specifically, Wesley has an incentive to raise this
claim because a plaintiff is not required to prove the employer's intent
to discriminate. 174
With the burden of production and persuasion on the plaintiff
throughout, 175 subsection (ii) first demands that Wesley prove Cytron
171. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) (finding, in a sex
discrimination case, the employer's statements concerning gender stereotypes were
"direct" evidence of intent to discriminate).
172. Since women, minority men, and members of certain other groups have
historically been victims of discrimination, it is reasonable to draw an inference of
discrimination where plaintiff demonstrates her adverse treatment was not based on the
"most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely" without
discrimination. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
358 n.44 (1977) (stating that the elimination of the most common legitimate reasons
upon which an employer may reject a job applicant "is sufficient, absent other
explanation, to create an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one.").
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (West 1994) (providing right of recovery of damages
against an employer for intentional discrimination).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 77-89 (stating employer's state of mind is
not an element of the new section 703(k)(1)(A) action).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56 (noting plaintiffs burden).
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based its adverse action on an employment practice. 7 6 Cytron's stated
reason for the discharge, excessive tardiness, easily satisfies this
burden. Discharging employees for excessive tardiness is clearly an
employment practice. Having stated its reason for discharging
Wesley, Cytron's ability to prove an alternative reason for the
discharge would be difficult. Additionally, it would be equally
challenging to assert the decision was ad hoc. This is also strategically
difficult because ad hoc decisions are more likely intentional
discrimination and made pursuant to the employer's general employ-
ment practice.
Under the first part of subsection (ii) Wesley must also prove that an
"alternative employment practice" exists that serves the employer's
interests and does not adversely affect the plaintiff.'77 Finding this
alternative practice may prove daunting. For example, if Wesley
worked alone on the night shift as a clerk in a convenience store,
Cytron may not be able to find an alternative that serves its interests.
If, however, Wesley's job does not involve such restrictive elements,
an alternative to the employer's excessive tardiness rule might be
available with flexible scheduling regimes that allow employers to
cover all job assignments while also solving problems for employees
like Wesley. For example, if Cytron's work hours conflict with child
care or school starting times, an employment practice incorporating
flexible starting times might serve Cytron's interests and eliminate the
adverse affect of the excessive tardiness rule.
Undoubtedly, Cytron would argue that a flexible scheduling practice
would not serve its interests. Employers can satisfy their own
interests without adversely affecting an individual employee by
granting an exception from a general practice. Yet, granting an
individual exception to a general rule may not qualify as an "alternative
employment practice" because the employer may successfully argue
that accommodating more than a few employees would not serve its
interests.
If, however, Cytron agrees with the practice, it likely has one
simple defense. The unusual usage in subsection (ii) of the term
"refuses" signifies that the employer can apparently terminate the
plaintiff's subsection (ii) case at any time by adopting the proposed
alternative practice. In doing so, the employer no longer "refuses" to
176. See supra text accompanying notes 113-138 (discussing broad meaning of
"employment practice").
177. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12, 138 (commenting on the
alternative employment practices).
510 [Vol. 30
Individual Disparate Impact Law
adopt the policy and this defeats any basis for disparate impact liability
pursuant to section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii).
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii), which was added to Title VII by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, is the source of an important new cause of action
for individual disparate impact discrimination. Given its plain
meaning, subsection (ii) creates a simple and straightforward cause of
action if the plaintiff can prove that she was adversely affected by the
defendant's employment practice, that an alternative practice exists that
would serve the defendant's legitimate interests, and that the defendant
refuses to use it. Valuable in its own right, subsection (ii) actions are
also useful adjuncts to disparate treatment actions in an era where
disparate treatment cases are difficult to prove.
Nevertheless, the defendant-employer may be able to defeat the
plaintiff's case in a number of ways. For instance, the defendant may
show the challenged employment practice is not actually a practice but
an ad hoc decision. Further, the defendant may be able to show the
plaintiff's proposed alternative employment practice does not serve its
interests. Finally, at any point during the litigation, prior to final
judgment, the defendant may adopt the alternative, thus no longer
refusing to adopt such alternative.
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